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ABSTRACT—Federal criminal sentencing doctrine is growing increasingly
favorable to the prosecution. This Note identifies two factors that
contribute to this “doctrinal drift.” First, district courts rarely issue written
opinions in the sentencing context. Second, prosecutors, unlike defense
attorneys, can strategically forego appeal in an individual case to avoid the
risk that the lower court’s pro-defense reasoning will be affirmed and
become binding precedent. In fact, 99% of all appeals of sentencing
decisions are defense appeals. When defendants appeal pro-prosecution
lower court decisions, the appellate court usually affirms, in part due to
deference. The result is a one-sided body of case law, composed primarily
of circuit court opinions affirming pro-prosecution decisions.
Consequently, when defense attorneys draft sentencing memoranda, they
face a dearth of precedent to support their position. Prosecutors, by
contrast, can choose from an abundance of favorable decisions.
Consequently, prosecution memoranda are more likely to persuade the
court, and with each round of appeals the doctrine drifts further in the proprosecution direction.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note contends that extrajudicial factors push criminal sentencing
doctrine in a pro-prosecution direction. Because 99% of sentencing appeals
are defense appeals,1 appellate court opinions affirming pro-prosecution2
1

See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
“Pro-prosecution” and “pro-defense” will be used throughout this Note as terms of art. The
following example will clarify their meaning: to calculate the sentence range for a criminal defendant,
the district court must determine the defendant’s “Offense Level” based on the offense and any
enhancements or reductions that apply. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/
GLMFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JF7-AX5R] (providing the chart used to determine the sentencing
range based on the offense level and the defendant’s criminal history category). The government may
request a four-level enhancement for the defendant’s aggravating role in the offense under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a), and the defendant may argue that the aggravating role enhancement does not apply at all. If
the court finds that the defendant played an aggravating role and holds that a four-level enhancement is
warranted, this decision would, of course, be labeled pro-prosecution. Suppose, on the other hand, that
the court concludes that the defendant played an aggravating role, but holds that only a two-level
enhancement is warranted. This district court decision would be difficult to categorize as either proprosecution or pro-defense because the court’s reasoning may be helpful to the prosecution (i.e.,
explaining why an enhancement is appropriate), to the defense (i.e., explaining why a four-level
enhancement would be too severe), or both. However, if the defendant appeals the district court
2
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criminal sentencing decisions constitute the bulk of binding precedent,
whereas pro-defense decisions disappear into the ether. As a result,
sentencing doctrine drifts in a pro-prosecution direction. This “doctrinal
drift” is concerning because, unlike the much-valued evolution of the
common law towards greater efficiency,3 this drift is not a product of
careful judicial decisionmaking. It is instead the result of a confluence of
extrajudicial factors completely disconnected from justice and fairness.
This Note focuses on two extrajudicial factors in particular: (1) the
lack of written sentencing decisions at the district court level and (2) the
asymmetric rate of appeals between criminal defendants and prosecutors.4
First, district courts rarely issue written sentencing decisions.5 Instead,
courts generally issue sentencing decisions by oral pronouncement.6
Second, double jeopardy bars prosecutors from appealing criminal
convictions,7 but even in the sentencing context where prosecutors can
appeal, they seldom do.8 By contrast, defense attorneys appeal a sentence
whenever colorable grounds for appeal exist; they owe a duty to their

decision, an appellate court decision affirming it would be labeled as pro-prosecution for the purposes
of this Note. The reason is that the appellate court would have to address and reject the defense
arguments as to why the enhancement is inapplicable, thereby providing favorable precedent for future
prosecution arguments. The opposite would also be true. If the prosecution appeals and the appellate
court affirms, the decision would be categorized as pro-defense, but this is a relatively rare occurrence.
3
Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto and Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An
Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 381 (2008) (“[C]ase law is a continuous, neverending process of evolution of legal rules that is characterized by probabilistic convergence toward
greater efficiency and predictability . . . .”).
4
This Note focuses on pro-prosecution doctrinal drift in the federal criminal justice system.
However, if the same two extrajudicial factors were present in a state’s criminal justice system, this
would suggest that doctrinal drift occurs at the state level as well.
5
Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic’s Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
345, 381 (conducting an empirical study of district court sentencing decisions in the District of
Massachusetts and finding that even where a written statement of reasons was mandatory, the judge
only wrote a formal sentencing opinion or attached a hearing transcript with more than fifty sentences
of explanation in a “tiny subset of cases”—only 1.1% of the total).
6
Id. at 362–63. Although it is rare, some district court judges do regularly issue sentencing
decisions in written form, including Judge Lynn Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. See,
e.g., United States v. Jordan, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
8
In 2014, the federal prosecutors appealed the sentence imposed in 43 cases, whereas defense
attorneys appealed the sentence imposed in 4,900 cases. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.56 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SOURCEBOOK],
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2014/Table56.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNP5-QGM9]; id. tbl.56A, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table56a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3ZMY-VVGC].
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clients to zealously protect their clients’ interests.9 As a result of this
asymmetry in the rate of appeals, appellate courts review almost
exclusively issues decided against the defendant in the court below.10 In
part due to the deferential standard of review,11 the appellate court affirms
the lower court in the overwhelming majority of cases.12
Stated a different way, when a district court imposes a sentence, four
scenarios are possible: (1) the decision is pro-defense and the government
appeals, (2) the decision is pro-defense and no one appeals, (3) the decision
is pro-prosecution and no one appeals, or (4) the decision is proprosecution and the defendant appeals.13 Regarding the first scenario,
prosecutors are not obligated to appeal sentencing decisions14 and rarely do
so.15 Prosecutors have the luxury of cherry-picking only the cases where
they are likely to win,16 and, consequently, in the majority of cases (65%)

9

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. and Scope 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”). As discussed
below, defense attorneys are sometimes obligated to appeal even where the claims are frivolous. See
infra text accompanying notes 132–37.
10
Over 99% of all sentencing appeals are defense appeals. See 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at
tbls.56A, 56.
11
Pure questions of law are reviewed de novo and all other conclusions are reviewed under a “clear
error,” “plain error,” or “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard of review. See, e.g., Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (overturning an appellate court’s reversal of a district court’s sentencing
decision and holding that the standard of review that applies to a lower court’s weighing of § 3553(a)
factors is a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”); United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 390
(6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the district court’s factual findings as to the sentence enhancement for “clear
error,” and reviewing the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the application of the Guidelines
de novo); United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that where the
defendant fails to object to the enhancement at sentencing, the appellate court reviews the district
court’s decision for “plain error”).
12
See 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.M, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureM.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS2WYMNH]. In 2014, federal appellate courts reversed only 10.2% of all sentencing decisions and affirmed
in part and reversed in part in only 2.3% of sentencing decisions. Id.
13
A fifth category of outcomes may include cases where the defense and prosecution come to an
agreement, which they present to the judge and the judge accepts. I have omitted this category above for
the sake of simplicity. For a discussion of plea agreements, see infra text accompanying note 187.
14
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-2.170(2)(3)(a)
(2015) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-2000-authorityus-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.170 [https://perma.cc/8N2X-U4K4].
15
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56A.
16
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-2.170(2)(3)(a) (“Authorization to appeal should
be sought only if: the sentencing decision is not supported by the law or the evidence, or the sentence is
unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the appeal holds a reasonable prospect of a favorable
result under the applicable standards of review.” (emphasis added)). That being said, prosecutors may
be inclined to bring appeals where a favorable outcome is not likely if the crime is particularly
egregious and the public has expressed outrage. DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 72 (1966) (observing that even where the

1134

111:1131 (2017)

Doctrinal Drift

where the government appeals a sentencing decision, it is reversed.17 In the
second scenario, where the decision is pro-defense and no one appeals, if
the court imposes the sentence by oral pronouncement,18 the court’s prodefense legal reasoning becomes silent law that exists only in a transcript
on PACER19 never to be cited as persuasive authority.20 The cases that fall
into the third category are those where the lower court’s sentencing
decision was pro-prosecution, but the defendant would have no viable
argument for reversal. The pro-prosecution reasoning of these decisions
also becomes silent law. Regarding the fourth outcome, when the defense
appeals, by contrast, the majority of sentences (74.4%) are affirmed,
resulting in a written appellate court opinion endorsing a pro-prosecution
decision.21 In short, few written sentencing opinions searchable on
LexisNexis and Westlaw present pro-defense reasoning, and most are proprosecution appellate court opinions affirming lower court decisions.
Consequently, when writing sentencing memoranda at the district
court level, defense attorneys confront a dearth of written opinions decided
in the defense’s favor. These defense attorneys are left to distinguish their

probability of conviction is low, a prosecutor may prefer to try the case if it is a serious offense and has
been highly publicized); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); infra text accompanying notes 36–41.
17
Of the forty-three sentencing decisions that the government appealed, 65.1% were reversed,
7.0% were affirmed in part and reversed in part, and 20.9% were affirmed. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 8, at tbl.56A.
18
In rare cases, judges produce written sentencing opinions. Here the focus is on the typical case,
where the judge explains the reasons for the sentence by oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing.
19
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) is an online archive where transcripts and
other documents from federal court proceedings from 1996 to the present are made available to view,
print, or download. JENNIFER J. BEHRENS, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW J. MICHAEL GOODSON
LAW LIBRARY RESEARCH GUIDES, COURT RECORDS & BRIEFS 4 (2016), https://law.duke.edu/
sites/default/files/lib/recordsbriefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9MP-H3HF]; Transcripts of Federal Court
Proceedings Nationwide to Be Available Online, U.S. COURTS (Sept. 18, 2007),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2007/09/18/transcripts-federal-court-proceedings-nationwide-beavailable-online [https://perma.cc/QN45-PX8J]; PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS,
PACER USER MANUAL FOR ECF COURTS 4 (2014), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/
pacermanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QER-HPHZ].
20
Scott, supra note 5, at 363 (“Often cluttered with irrelevant material, jarred by interruptions, and
disorganized, a sentencing transcript is a poor substitute for a written opinion explaining the reasons for
a sentence.”).
21
Among the sentencing decisions appealed by the defense, 9.8% were reversed, 2.3% were
affirmed in part and reversed in part, and 74.4% were affirmed. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at
tbl.56. By contrast, among government appeals, 65.1% were reversed, 7.0% were affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and 20.9% were affirmed. Id. tbl.56A. However, just looking at the percentages can be
misleading. A comparison of the raw numbers reveals that defendants won 480 appeals in 2014,
whereas the government won only 28. Id. tbls.56, 56A. Thus, although prosecutors won a much higher
percentage of appeals, defendants won a significantly higher number of appeals. This suggests that the
government is strategically selecting the cases in which it has high odds of winning.
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cases from the binding precedent.22 By contrast, prosecution sentencing
memoranda, with an abundance of favorable appellate court precedent in
support of their arguments, are likely to be more persuasive.23 When judges
(or their clerks) turn to Westlaw or LexisNexis to determine whether a
certain sentence enhancement applies, they discover a mountain of proprosecution precedent.24 Judges may be inclined to decide the legal issue in
the government’s favor because most appellate court precedent supports the
government’s position.25 As that decision is unlikely to be reversed, each
subsequent round of appeals contributes to an increasingly prosecutionfriendly body of binding precedent.
Part I of this Note defines and provides examples of doctrinal drift. It
also explains how the Guidelines function and describes the role of the
Guidelines after the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in
United States v. Booker.26 Further, it provides examples of doctrinal drift by
demonstrating how particular lines of doctrine have become more favorable
to the prosecution over time. Part II identifies the causes of the one-sided
body of law favoring the prosecution, namely (1) the lack of written district
court sentencing decisions and (2) the disparate rate of appeals between the
prosecution and the defense. Part III explains how this one-sided body of
law leads to doctrinal drift with each subsequent round of appeals. Part IV
acknowledges other factors that influence the development of case law and
addresses the counterargument that the law is instead growing increasingly
friendly to the defense. Finally, Part V proposes and evaluates possible
solutions to the problem of pro-prosecution doctrinal drift in sentencing.

22

See infra text accompanying notes 175–83.
See Eric Voigt, Choosing the Best Cases: Five Reminders for New Lawyers, LEGAL WRITING
EDITOR (Dec. 4, 2013), http://legalwritingeditor.com/2013/12/04/choosing-best-cases-five-rules-newlawyers/ [https://perma.cc/QC58-YDEG] (advising lawyers to avoid making assertions without citations
to precedent because “without citations, judges might think that the stated rules and arguments are
merely your opinions—which are irrelevant”).
24
See infra Part II.
25
See Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think
About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 257, 264 (2002) (finding, based on survey of
355 federal judges, that citation to “relevant, controlling authority” is a key component of good legal
writing); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 643, 683 (2015) (reasoning that when appellate courts have affirmed the admission of latent
fingerprint evidence in 24 of 25 cases, a district court “faced with this one-sided body of appellate
fingerprint precedent might erroneously conclude that it has no discretion to exclude such evidence”).
26
543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (severing and excising the provision making the Guidelines mandatory
because it violated the Sixth Amendment).
23
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DOCTRINAL DRIFT AND THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A.

What Is Doctrinal Drift?

For the purposes of this Note, doctrinal drift27 refers to systematic
shifts in doctrine over time as a result of extrajudicial factors. This drift is
not to be confused with the highly valued evolution of the common law.
Indeed, scholars have posited that “case law is a continuous, never-ending
process of evolution of legal rules that is characterized by probabilistic
convergence toward greater efficiency and predictability.”28 Instead, this
Note identifies the asymmetric rate of appeals between the parties and the
courts’ practice of issuing some types of decisions by oral pronouncement
as distorting the otherwise salutary development of the common law.29
Even if one believes that the doctrine in a particular field of law is moving
in a desirable direction, the development of the law in a well-functioning
legal system should not be based on extrajudicial factors.30
This Note is the first piece of scholarship to identify pro-prosecution
doctrinal drift in criminal sentencing. However, it falls within a larger
tradition of scholarship identifying extrajudicial factors that produce
systematic shifts in doctrine over time.31 Scholars have identified doctrinal

27

Thank you to Professor James Pfander for suggesting this term to describe the phenomenon this
Note identifies.
28
Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 3, at 381; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (9th ed. 2014) (arguing that efficiency, or wealth maximization, can explain the
development of the case law).
29
Masur & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 725 (“Regardless of one’s normative view of an area of
law, issues like which party appeals more frequently, whether a lower court is biased, or whether courts
are more likely to make one type of error than another should play no role in that doctrine’s
development.”).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 643–44 (presenting a “theoretical model of how deference mistakes, coupled with
particular asymmetries in adjudication, can generate systematic shifts in legal doctrine”); David
Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2014) (presenting the theory that private qui tam enforcement, as opposed to public
enforcement, can systematically shift the doctrine over time); Galanter, supra note 16, at 97, 102
(positing that the body of law is skewed to favor the “repeat players” who have strategized to maximize
favorable rulemaking); Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110 (2012) (arguing
that employment discrimination law has systematically shifted in a pro-defense direction due to
extrajudicial factors); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117 (presenting the view that when courts refuse to reach the merits of
constitutional tort claims and dispose of cases on qualified immunity grounds, constitutional rights will
degrade over time); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 470 (2011) (suggesting that
patent law has shifted in a pro-patent direction due to the asymmetry in parties’ rights to appeal to
adverse decisions); Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortion in the Evolution of
Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625, 625 (2015) (arguing that deference asymmetries in regulatory
law may push the development of the doctrine in a pro-regulated-entity direction).
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drift in various areas, including employment discrimination,32 patent law,33
regulatory law,34 and constitutional torts.35
In the 1970s, Professor Marc Galanter upended the usual analysis of
how the legal system affects the parties, arguing that, in fact, it was
differences between the parties that shaped the legal system and its rules.36
He divided the parties into two categories: “repeat players,” who are
involved in many similar cases over the years, and “one-shotters,” whose
involvement in litigation is only occasional.37 One-shotters include a spouse
in a divorce, an auto injury claimant, and a criminal defendant, whereas
repeat players include an insurance company, a finance company, and a
prosecutor.38 Because repeat players anticipate repeat litigation, their
litigation strategy focuses on favorable rulemaking that protects their longterm interests.39 For instance, a repeat player may settle a case if it
anticipates an unfavorable rule outcome, or it may adjudicate or appeal
those issues where it expects to generate favorable precedent.40 The logical
consequence, Galanter suggests, is a body of precedent skewed to favor the
repeat players.41
Legal scholar and former U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner
built on Galanter’s insight in the context of employment discrimination,
arguing that extrajudicial factors have produced a pro-employer shift in the
doctrine.42 Gertner explains that most often it is the defendant–employers,
and not plaintiff–employees, that move for summary judgment because
plaintiff–employees bear the burden of proof.43 She further explains that,
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judges should
state on the record the reasons for granting or denying a motion for
summary judgment.44 In practice, however, judges write full opinions when
granting a motion, but when denying a motion, judges facing staggering
caseloads usually find that one word suffices: “denied.”45 Gertner argues
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
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Gertner, supra note 31.
Masur, supra note 31.
Wasserman, supra note 31.
Jeffries, Jr., supra note 31.
Galanter, supra note 16, at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 98–101.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Gertner, supra note 31, at 109–10.
Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 113; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
Gertner, supra note 31, at 113.
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that “[t]he result of this practice—written decisions only when plaintiffs
lose—is the evolution of a one-sided body of law.”46 If the plaintiff–
employee appeals, the appellate court will most likely affirm the lower
court’s pro-defense decision, thereby contributing to the mountain of proemployer precedent.47 As the doctrine has drifted, defendant–employers
have become increasingly likely to succeed at the summary judgment
phase, despite persuasive evidence of discrimination.48 This Note addresses
a doctrinal drift phenomenon similar to those that Galanter and Gertner
identified, but focuses on the unique characteristics of the criminal
sentencing context.
B.

How Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work?

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide a recommended
sentencing range based on characteristics of the defendant and the
offense.49 It is necessary to first understand how the Guidelines operate to
lay the foundation for the claim that the interpretation of these Guidelines
is drifting in a pro-prosecution direction. The Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 created the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) and
authorized the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines.50 The
Commission completed the initial Guidelines in April 1987, which took
effect on November 1, 1987, and have been revised from time to time in
the intervening years.51 The Act delegated authority to the Commission to
specify an appropriate sentencing range for each class of convicted persons
based on the offense behavior and offender characteristics.52 For each
46

Id. at 114.
Id. (citing Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 553 (2003) (examining appellate court
data from 1987 to 2000, where parties in employment discrimination cases appealed unfavorable
pretrial rulings, and finding that defendants obtained reversals in 42.28% of cases, whereas plaintiffs
obtained reversals in only 10.66% of cases)).
48
Id. at 121. More specifically, Gertner identifies several doctrines that have developed which
serve to dispose of more cases at the summary judgment phase. Id. at 118–21. Under one such doctrine,
courts have held that explicit statements of bias are sometimes mere “stray remarks” unrelated to the
employer’s motivations for terminating an employee. Id. at 118–20. For instance, in one case, the
employer directed a racial slur at the employee, and the court found that this was a mere stray remark,
unconnected to the decision to terminate the employee. Id. at 120–21 (citing Shorter v. ICG Holdings,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d
1217, 1226 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008)).
49
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3JF7-AX5R].
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
47
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offense, the Guidelines set a “base offense level” and then provide for
increases to that level based on “specific offense characteristics.”53 The
Guidelines also provide for adjustments downward if, for instance, the
defendant played a minor role54 in the offense or accepted responsibility for
the offense by pleading guilty.55 Once the applicable increases are added to
the base offense level and the applicable reductions are subtracted, the
resulting figure is the “Offense Level,” located on the vertical axis of the
Sentencing Table (Table 1).56 A criminal defendant receives “Criminal
History Points” for prior sentences of imprisonment, and that point total
determines the “Criminal History Category,” which is located on the
horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table.57 To calculate the sentence range,
one would locate the intersection of the “Offense Level” and the “Criminal
History Category.”58 For instance, the base offense level for “extortion by
force or threat of injury or serious damage” is eighteen.59 A defendant who
pleaded guilty to this offense would be eligible for up to a three-level
decrease for acceptance of responsibility.60 If a firearm was discharged in
connection with the offense, the Guidelines would call for an increase of
seven levels.61 The resulting offense level would be twenty-two. Assuming
the defendant had no criminal history, he would fall in Criminal History
Category I, and his sentencing range would be forty-one to fifty-one
months.62

53

See, e.g., id. § 2B3.2(b)(1) (allowing for an increase of two levels when extortion involved
“express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping”).
54
Id. § 3B1.2.
55
Id. § 3E1.1.
56
Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. § 2B3.2(a).
60
Id. § 3E1.1.
61
Id. § 2B3.2(b)(3).
62
Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
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TABLE 1: SENTENCING TABLE FROM THE 2015 U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL
SENTENCING TABLE
(in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)

Zone A

Zone B
Zone C

Offense
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6

I
(0 or 1)
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6

II
(2 or 3)
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
1-7

III
(4, 5, 6)
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
1-7
2-8

IV
(7, 8, 9)
0-6
0-6
0-6
2-8
4-10
6-12

V
(10, 11, 12)
0-6
0-6
2-8
4-10
6-12
9-15

VI
(13 or more)
0-6
1-7
3-9
6-12
9-15
12-18

7
8
9

0-6
0-6
4-10

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
8-14

8-14
10-16
12-18

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

10
11
12
13
14
15

6-12
8-14
10-16
12-18
15-21
18-24

8-14
10-16
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27

10-16
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30

15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37

21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46

24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51

16
17
18

21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46

24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51

27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57

33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71

41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87

46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
77-96

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

51-63
57-71
63-78

63-78
70-87
77-96

77-96
84-105
92-115

84-105
92-115
100-125

57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121

63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135

70-87
78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151

84-105
92-115
100-125
110-137
121-151
135-168

100-125
110-137
120-150
130-162
140-175
151-188

110-137
120-150
130-162
140-175
151-188
168-210

108-135
121-151
135-168

121-151
135-168
151-188

135-168
151-188
168-210

151-188
168-210
188-235

168-210
188-235
210-262

188-235
210-262
235-293

151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327

168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365

188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405

210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life

235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life

262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
360-life

292-365
324-405
360-life

324-405
360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life
360-life

life

life

life

life

life

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Zone D

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

– 404 –

life
November 1, 2015

Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker in 2005,63
the Guidelines were mandatory.64 That meant that courts were bound to
impose a sentence within the maximum and minimum sentences of the
Guidelines range.65 In Booker, the Court held that the mandatory nature of
the Guidelines denied defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial because they called on the judge to make factual determinations to
reach the appropriate sentence.66 As a remedy, the Court elected to sever
and excise the provision of the federal sentencing statute that made the

63
64
65
66

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 233.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 243–45.
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Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).67 This rendered the
Guidelines advisory.68 Courts are now required to consider the Guidelines
range, but can impose a sentence outside the range based on factors listed
in § 3553(a), which include general categories of considerations such as the
“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,” “the need for the sentence imposed,” and the “need to
provide restitution to any victims.”69
C.

Doctrinal Drift in the Interpretation of the Guidelines After Booker

Though Booker has rendered the Guidelines advisory, doctrinal drift
in the interpretation of their enhancement and reduction provisions still
impacts sentencing outcomes. While courts can use their discretion in
imposing a sentence below (or above) the Guidelines range, they must first
correctly calculate the Guidelines range.70 Failure to correctly calculate the
Guidelines range could result in reversal.71 This requirement ensures that
the Guidelines continue to function as the “framework” for sentencing and
serve as a “starting point” for all sentencing decisions.72 What is more,
sentencing data indicate that judges continue to rely heavily on the
calculated Guidelines range in sentencing decisions. Of all sentences
imposed in 2014, 76.3% either fell within the calculated range or fell below
the range due to a government-sponsored departure.73 Specifically, 46% of
sentences were within the calculated Guidelines range.74 The government
sponsored a downward departure in 30.3% of cases either because the
defendant cooperated with law enforcement or because some other

67

Id. at 245.
Id.
69
Id. at 245–46; 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a) (2012).
70
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
50 n.6 (2007)).
71
Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
72
Id.; see also Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009) (per curiam) (“[T]he sentencing
court must first calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the
individual defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explaining any
variance from the former with reference to the latter.”).
73
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.G., http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureG.pdf [https://perma.cc/N35C-72RN]; id.
at
tbl.N,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2014/TableN.pdf [https://perma.cc/2269-XN7F].
74
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.G. Compare the 2014 figures with those from 2004,
before Booker came down. In 2004, 72.2% of sentences fell within the Guideline range. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.26 (2004),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2004/table26pre_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S55-CDTM].
68
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mitigating factor was present.75 In 21.4% of cases, courts imposed a belowGuidelines sentence although it was not government sponsored, and in
2.2% of cases, courts imposed an above-Guidelines sentence.76 Therefore,
only 23.6% of sentences fell outside of the Guidelines range without
government sponsorship.77 Even for the cases falling outside the Guidelines
range, if courts stray too far from the range, they risk reversal.78 In sum,
district courts’ interpretations of the various Guidelines provisions remain
relevant to the ultimate sentence they decide to impose, and thus any
doctrinal drift affecting their interpretations would likewise impact the
length of the sentences.
D.

Examples of Pro-Prosecution Doctrinal Drift

The following Section provides two examples of pro-prosecution
doctrinal drift in sentencing. They illustrate how the law has grown
friendlier to the prosecution with respect to (1) the interpretation of the
§ 3B1.1 aggravating role enhancement and (2) the interpretation of the
§ 3B1.2 mitigating role reduction and the role of getaway drivers.
1.

Section 3B1.1 “Otherwise Extensive” Criminal Activity
Enhancement.—According to the text of § 3B1.1(a), the four-level
enhancement applies if the defendant is an “organizer or leader of a
criminal activity” that either “involved five or more participants” or was
“otherwise extensive.”79 This last provision generated litigation as courts
wrestled with what is required for criminal activity to be considered
otherwise extensive. The Commission added Note 3 to § 3B1.1 to explain

75

2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.N.
Id. fig.G.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a sentence
nearly four-times as long as the Guidelines sentence was unreasonable); United States v. Trupin,
475 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 552 U.S. 1089 (2008) (holding that a
seven-month sentence for tax evasion that was thirty-four months below the bottom of the Guidelines
range was unreasonably lenient). But see Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009) (holding
that district courts are entitled to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy
disagreement with the crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentencing disparity). In 2014, courts
sentenced below the Guidelines range in 12,495 cases based on Booker and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.31C, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table31c.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR64Q9SB]. In these cases the median sentence imposed was twenty-seven months, and the median decrease
in months from the bottom end of the Guideline range was fifteen months—a median decrease of
35.7%. Id.
79
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3JF7-AX5R].
76
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that the court should look to all persons involved in the offense—not just
participants—to determine whether criminal activity is otherwise
extensive.80 Note 3 offers an example of a case where the criminal activity
could be considered otherwise extensive: where the criminal activity
involved only three participants but used the services of “many outsiders.”81
In United States v. Tai, the Seventh Circuit held that if the number of
participants and outsiders was the sole basis for the otherwise extensive
enhancement, a total of more than five participants and outsiders was
necessary, but the court did not state that it would in every case be
sufficient for the application of the enhancement.82 The court reversed the
district court’s ruling that the enhancement applied where the total number
of participants and outsiders was five.83 In United States v. Shearer, a
Seventh Circuit opinion issued in 2007, the court misstated the rule from
Tai, holding instead that “criminal activity is ‘otherwise extensive’ if it
involves some combination of participants and unknowing outsiders
totaling more than five.”84 What was a necessary condition in Tai became a
sufficient condition in Shearer.
In United States v. Caputo, decided in 2010, a district court in the
Seventh Circuit spotted the Shearer court’s mischaracterization of Tai and
emphasized that longstanding precedent dictated that a total of more than
five participants and outsiders meant only that the court was permitted to
find the scheme otherwise extensive—not that is was required to do so.85
However, Caputo is an unpublished district court opinion that the
prosecution did not appeal, and is cited in only one brief on Westlaw,
which did not ultimately persuade the court.86 The district court’s attempt to
80

Id. § 3B1.1 n.3.
Id. For instance, in United States v. Olive, the defendant ran a fraudulent scheme in which he
paid financial advisors a high commission to supply him with new clients. 804 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016), reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 329 (2016). The Sixth Circuit
concluded that the otherwise extensive prong was satisfied because the defendant’s scheme involved
many financial advisors. Id. at 759.
82
41 F.3d 1170, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1994).
83
Id. at 1175.
84
479 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2007).
85
2010 WL 1032621, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2010) (“Though Shearer states that ‘criminal
activity is “otherwise extensive” if it involves some combination of participants and unknowing
outsiders totaling more than five,’ the opinion relies on cases that hold only that a district court may find
that a scheme is otherwise extensive based solely on the number of participants and innocent outsiders
involved in the scheme if they number more than five.” (citing Tai, 41 F.3d at 1174–75)). The court
held that even though the offense involved more than seven participants and outsiders, other factors,
such as the relatively small amount of money collected, counseled against a finding that the scheme was
otherwise extensive. Id.
86
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 36, United States v. Sullivan, 765 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2014)
(Nos. 12-3631, 12-3670), 2013 WL 5885573, at *35; Sullivan, 765 F.3d at 719.
81
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correct the pro-prosecution shift in the circuit’s precedent in Shearer was
fruitless. In United States v. Pabey, the Seventh Circuit applied the altered
standard: that the involvement of more than five participants and outsiders
is sufficient to render criminal activity otherwise extensive.87 The evolution
of the interpretation of the otherwise extensive prong of § 3B1.1(a)
demonstrates how the current of extrajudicial factors pulls the law in a proprosecution direction, and even a well-meaning district court cannot steer
the doctrine back on course.
2. Section 3B1.2(b) Minor Role Reduction.—The change in the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of § 3B1.2(b) also lends support to the position that
the law evolves in a pro-prosecution direction over time. Section 3B1.2(b)
provides that a defendant is eligible for a two-level reduction if he was a
“minor participant” in the criminal activity.88 In its 1995 decision, United
States v. Lowery, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to
grant the minor role reduction under § 3B1.2(b).89 The appellate court
reasoned that the defendant, in addition to serving as the getaway driver,
had actively participated in the planning of the robbery by choosing the
date and helping to make the masks.90 In United States v. Cottrell and
United States v. Dale in 1999, and United States v. Magliocca in 2000, the
Sixth Circuit echoed its Lowery holding, concluding that the district court
did not clearly err in refusing to apply the minor role reduction where the
defendant drove the getaway car and actively participated in the planning
of the bank robbery.91
Then in United States v. Patton in 2001, the Sixth Circuit shifted its
understanding of the minor role reduction in a pro-prosecution direction.92
In Patton, the Sixth Circuit held that even though the defendant learned of
his codefendants’ criminal plot only a few hours before the robbery, his
role as getaway driver was sufficient for the district court to find that he
was not a minor participant.93 By 2003, when the Sixth Circuit decided

87

664 F.3d 1084, 1097 (7th Cir. 2011).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3JF7-AX5R].
89
60 F.3d 1199, 1202 (6th Cir. 1995).
90
Id. at 1201–02.
91
United States v. Magliocca, No. 99-3916, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33874, at *4–5 (6th Cir. Dec.
19, 2000); United States v. Cottrell, No. 97-6477, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2224, at *3–4 (6th Cir. Feb.
9, 1999); United States v. Dale, No. 98-3687, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18317, at *12 (6th Cir. Aug. 2,
1999).
92
14 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2001).
93
Id.
88
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United States v. Brown,94 it appeared well settled that serving the “pivotal”
role of getaway driver rendered the defendant ineligible for a minor
participant reduction.95 The Brown decision does not cite a single case in
the Lowery line of cases, and, even more telling, the Brown decision was a
response to an Anders brief,96 meaning that the defendant’s attorney felt
that any challenge to the refusal of a minor role reduction for a getaway
driver was frivolous.97 This pro-prosecution change in the doctrine raises
the question: What would justify the application of the minor role reduction
if merely serving as a getaway driver without any involvement in the
criminal plot renders a defendant ineligible?98 This line of doctrine seems to
have slipped through the judges’ fingers, making it ever more challenging
to prove that a minor role reduction does apply and ever easier to prove that
it does not. In conclusion, the changes in the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation of § 3B1.1 and the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of
§ 3B1.2(b) suggest that criminal sentencing doctrine is drifting in a proprosecution direction. The next Part will examine factors that contribute to
this drift.
II.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE ONE-SIDED BODY OF PRECEDENT

This Part will identify two contributors to the skewed body of case
law. First, judges rarely issue written sentencing decisions.99 Second, 99%
of all appeals of sentencing decisions are defense appeals.100 Prosecutors
can shape the legal landscape by foregoing appeal to eliminate the risk that
an appellate court will affirm a pro-defense decision. Thus, appellate courts
are confronted almost exclusively with defense appeals of pro-prosecution
decisions, and, in part due to deference to the lower courts, appellate courts
usually affirm. These factors contribute to a body of sentencing law
composed primarily of appellate court opinions that affirm pro-prosecution
decisions and employ reasoning that bolsters pro-prosecution arguments.

94

55 F. App’x 753 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 754 (“Brown was not entitled to a reduction for being a minimal or a minor participant in
the offenses . . . Brown’s role as the getaway driver can be said to have been pivotal or necessary to the
success of the robberies.”).
96
A so-called Anders brief is the brief a criminal defense attorney files if his or her client insists on
appealing even though the attorney believes an appeal would be frivolous. See infra text accompanying
notes 134–37.
97
Brown, 55 F. App’x at 753–54; see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
98
See Gertner, supra note 31, at 115 (providing the parallel example of decisionmakers struggling
to envision facts that would constitute discrimination where “case after case recites the facts that do not
amount to discrimination”).
99
See infra Section II.A.
100
See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
95
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A.

Few Written District Court Opinions

Because most appellate court sentencing opinions affirm proprosecution decisions, the decisions that provide persuasive pro-defense
reasoning are primarily the district court sentencing decisions. But written
district court sentencing decisions are rare. Federal judges in the U.S. are
under no general mandate to issue decisions by formal, written opinion.101
In the sentencing context, instead of producing written opinions, judges
normally announce the reasons for the sentence in open court pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).102 An empirical study examining all of the sentencing
decisions issued in fiscal year 2006 by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts revealed that judges wrote a formal sentencing
opinion in less than 1.1% of cases.103 It is neither obstinacy nor lack of
interest, but rather the high volume of sentencing decisions that compels
judges to forego a formal written sentencing opinion in most cases.104
Searches for district court sentencing opinions on Westlaw
corroborate the Massachusetts study and suggest that the scarcity of such
opinions is widespread. An example using decisions that deal with the
§ 3B1.1 aggravating role enhancement illustrates that written district court
decisions are rare. A Westlaw query for federal court cases containing
“3B1.1” with a filter for criminal cases only, produces 7,936 results. Of
these results, only 21.86% are district court opinions, versus 78.07%
appellate court opinions.105 Thus, even though district courts issue many
101

Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 490–91 (2015) (contrasting the civil law countries of
continental Europe, where judges are mandated to write opinions for all cases, with the United States,
where no such mandate exists); see also United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1974)
(“It is the oral sentence which constitutes the judgment of the court, and which is authority for the
execution of the court’s sentence. The written commitment is ‘mere evidence of such authority.’”
(quoting Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1969))).
102
Scott, supra note 5, at 362–63; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012) (“The court, at the time of
sentencing shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.”); FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 128–37 (6th ed. 2013) (providing a
suggested outline for the oral sentencing hearing); see also United States v. Cooper, 394 F.3d 172, 176
(3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the sentencing court’s oral explanation of reasons was adequate).
103
Scott, supra note 5, at 379 (analyzing sentencing decisions from fiscal year 2006, which was
October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006). Judges are required to fill out a form called a Statement of
Reasons when issuing a sentencing decision. § 3553(c)(2). The 1.1% figure from the study included not
only written opinions, but also decisions where the judge attached a hearing transcript to the Statement
of Reasons that included more than fifty sentences of explanation. Scott, supra note 5, at 379.
104
Scott, supra note 5, at 363; see also Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), Opinions I Should Have
Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 428 (2016) (arguing that federal judges feel pressure to issue oral
pronouncements instead of producing written opinions for efficiency’s sake).
105
Of the 7,936 criminal cases that mention § 3B1.1, 0.06% are Supreme Court opinions. As stated
above, 21.86% of all opinions citing § 3B1.1 are district court opinions. I filtered for reported decisions
and discovered that an even smaller fraction of published decisions are district court decisions
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more sentencing decisions than appellate courts review, district court
decisions represent a small fraction of all written sentencing decisions.
From fiscal years 2006 to 2015, district courts ruled that the § 3B1.1
enhancement applied in 31,166 cases.106 It seems quite reasonable to
assume that the government requested the application of § 3B1.1 in many
more cases where the district courts elected not to apply it. Despite this,
district courts only issued a written opinion mentioning this enhancement
1,151 times from during the relevant time period,107 around 3.7% of the
total applications of the rule (far less if we take into account the cases
where the government requested a § 3B1.1 enhancement but it was found
not to apply). In the less than 4% of cases where the district court produced
(12.93%). However, under the modern approach, the precedential weight of published district court
opinions may not be greater than that of unpublished district court opinions. Joseph W. Mead, Stare
Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 804 (2012) (concluding that
published and unpublished district court opinions are treated alike); see also FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
(establishing the rule that courts may not prohibit citation to unpublished opinions issued after January
1, 2007).
106
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 2015 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.18 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2015/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZRZ-PNGV] (reporting that courts found
§ 3B1.1 to apply in 3,260 cases in 2015); 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.18,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2014/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KCT-HC84] (3,293 cases in 2014); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2013),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2013/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/88TT-4EWJ] (3,366 cases in 2013); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2012/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UVU-UJM9] (3,377 cases in 2012); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2011),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2011/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JBN-VGHG] (3,142 cases in 2011); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2010),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2010/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJ3E-DYAC] (3,006 cases in 2010); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2009),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2009/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/68Z8-YYMB] (2,985 cases in 2009); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2008),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2008/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2JQ-AMMU] (2,981 cases in 2008); UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2007),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2007/Table18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J22Y-VE77] (2,865 cases in 2007); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2006) [hereinafter 2006
SOURCEBOOK],
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/2006/table18_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E62A-BVLA] (2,892 cases in 2006).
107
Note that the U.S. Sentencing Commission data is gathered by fiscal year. Therefore, the exact
date range examined on Westlaw was October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2015.
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a written opinion, only some include reasoning favorable to the defense and
many others provide pro-prosecution reasoning. The lack of written district
court sentencing opinions translates into a dearth of case law favorable to
the defense eclipsed by an abundance of pro-prosecution precedent,
because most appellate court precedent favors the prosecution. The next
Section will address why appellate court precedent consists mainly of proprosecution affirmances.
B.

Asymmetric Rate of Appeals and Appellate Court Affirmances

Double jeopardy bars prosecutors from appealing criminal
convictions, but even in the sentencing arena, where prosecutors have the
option to appeal,108 they almost never do. Of the total 75,836 sentencing
decisions in 2014,109 the government appealed only 43.110 Defendants, by
contrast, appealed in 4,900 cases—that is, over 100 times as many cases.111
Of all the sentencing appeals reviewed by the courts of appeals in 2014,
over 99% of them were defense appeals of pro-prosecution district court
decisions.112 In sum, defendants appeal much more frequently than the
government, and, as demonstrated below, courts usually affirm when the
defense appeals.
In 2014, the courts of appeal reversed only 9.8% of defense appeals
and affirmed 74.4% of the decisions that the defense appealed.113 This is
due in part to the deference paid to lower courts in sentencing. With the
exception of legal conclusions by the district court, which are reviewed de
novo,114 all other sentencing decisions are reviewed under a deferential
standard.115 In Gall v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that
appellate courts are to review decisions to impose a particular sentence
under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion” standard, taking into account that
district court judges have more experience sentencing criminal defendants
than appellate court judges.116 Although the deference afforded to district

108

U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-2.170(2)(3)(a).
In 2014, appellate courts reversed in part and affirmed in part in 2.3% of defense appeals. 2014
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56.
110
Id. tbl.56A.
111
Id. tbl.56.
112
Id. tbls.56A, 56 (showing that 4,900 out of 4,943 appeals were defense appeals of proprosecution district court decisions).
113
Id. tbl.56.
114
United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Saikaly,
297 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 2000)).
115
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); Miggins, 302 F.3d at 390; United States v. Starks,
309 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002).
116
552 U.S. at 52 n.7.
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1149

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

courts in sentencing is “not unlimited, it is substantial.”117 Factual findings
with regards to the application of an enhancement are reviewed for clear
error,118 and the appellate court reviews for plain error where the defendant
failed to object at the trial court level.119
The appellate court decisions that serve as pro-defense precedent
include only the reversals of pro-prosecution decisions and the affirmances
of pro-defense decisions. In 2014, there were 480 reversals of proprosecution decisions and 9 affirmances of pro-defense decisions.120
Therefore, out of the 4,154121 appellate sentencing decisions, only 489 serve
as pro-defense precedent—that is 11.8% of the total. By this calculation,
88.2% of all appellate court sentencing decisions from 2014 would be proprosecution precedent, resulting in a clearly one-sided body of case law.
The one-sided body of case law is, of course, a result of the
extrajudicial factors identified—not careful judicial decisionmaking. The
federal appellate courts see government appeals of pro-defense decisions
very rarely.122 For instance, in 2014, federal appellate courts reviewed 158
district court decisions imposing an aggravating role enhancement under
§ 3B1.1.123 By contrast, the federal appellate courts reviewed a district
court’s decision not to impose an aggravating role enhancement only
once.124 As discussed above, the appellate court will usually find that the
district court did not clearly err in imposing the enhancement.125 What the
appellate court has to say about the district courts’ decision not to impose
the enhancement is relatively unknown, but, in all likelihood, the appellate
courts would affirm the pro-defense outcome with the same frequency.126
117

United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015).
Miggins, 302 F.3d at 390.
119
Starks, 309 F.3d at 1026. See infra text accompanying notes 192–201 for a discussion of the
impact of the standard of review on successive rounds of appeals.
120
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbls.56A, 56.
121
This figure represents the sum of 3,649 affirmances and 505 reversals. Id. fig.M. For the sake of
simplicity, it excludes the appeals that were dismissed (602) or remanded (62), as well as those that
were affirmed in part and reversed in part (112). Id.
122
In fact, the number of government appeals of sentencing decisions has decreased in recent
years. In 2006, the government appealed 212 sentencing decisions and by 2014 the number of
government sentencing appeals had dropped to 43. 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 106, at tbl.56A;
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56A.
123
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.57, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table57.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BE9-RFEX].
124
Id. tbl.58, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/2014/Table58_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKR5-SPUN].
125
Appellate courts affirmed 74.4% of defense sentencing appeals in 2014. Id. tbl.56; see supra
text accompanying notes 113–19.
126
D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I
Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in
118

1150

111:1131 (2017)

Doctrinal Drift

Although hypothetically those pro-defense appellate court cases might exist
if the appellate courts had the opportunity to review more pro-defense
district court opinions, in the current system, they do not. This leaves little
precedent favorable to the defense and a wealth of pro-prosecution
precedent.
C.

Asymmetric Rules and Incentives

The disparate rate of appeals between the prosecution and defense
raises the question: Why do prosecutors choose not to appeal adverse
sentencing decisions? Are they simply saving their scarce resources, or is
this a strategic move aimed at producing precisely the one-sided body of
case law described? This Note contends that the latter is more likely. In
fact, this Note confirms Galanter’s categorization of prosecutors as “repeat
players”: they anticipate repeat litigation over time and forego appeal to
avoid unfavorable precedent that will pose challenges down the road.127
Where a district court issues a pro-defense sentencing decision by oral
pronouncement, if prosecutors decide not to appeal, the judge’s reasoning
will become silent law, and they can thereby avoid the risk that the decision
will haunt them as unfavorable circuit precedent in future cases.
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual provides that Assistant U.S. Attorneys
should seek authorization for appeal only if: (1) “the sentencing decision is
not supported by the law or the evidence” or (2) “the sentence is
unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”128 Even if one of these
prongs is met, the Assistant U.S. Attorney is not to seek authorization to
appeal unless “the appeal holds a reasonable prospect of a favorable result
under the applicable standards of review.”129 Furthermore, the Department

General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447,
468 (2007). Professor Risinger describes a similar phenomenon with regards to the admissibility of the
testimony of the prosecution’s handwriting identification experts. Id. Handwriting expert testimony is
offered as evidence of guilt where handwriting samples recovered by law enforcement match a criminal
defendant’s handwriting exemplars. Id. at 469. Risinger laments that appellate courts only see cases
where the incriminating testimony was admitted and the defendant was convicted. Id. Therefore,
“[w]hat appellate courts would have to say about the exclusion or limitation under an abuse of
discretion standard is unknown, but it seems likely that, given appropriate hearing and findings, that
result would be most likely be [sic] affirmed also.” Id.
127
Galanter, supra note 16, at 101 (“Since they expect to litigate again, RPs can select to
adjudicate (or appeal) those cases which they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules.”).
128
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 9-2.170(2)(3)(a).
129
Id. (emphasis added). To illustrate when the government might seek an appeal, in United States
v. Nazerzadeh, the defendant was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography. 280 F.
Appx 432, 433 (5th Cir. 2008). The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 210–262 months
(17.5 years to nearly 22 years), but imposed a term of imprisonment of only 5 years (less than one-third
of the lowest recommended term), as well as lifetime supervised release. Id. The government appealed
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of Justice constrains individual prosecutors’ discretion by prohibiting them
from appealing unless the Solicitor General authorizes the appeal.130 While
the government’s procedures maximize its ability to shape the law to its
advantage, defense attorneys’ ethical responsibilities, by contrast, promote
even ill-fated litigation.
Defense attorneys are ethically required to zealously protect their
client’s interests.131 The Supreme Court has held that defense attorneys’
“role as advocate requires that [they] support [their] client’s appeal to the
best of [their] ability.”132 Criminal defense attorneys are required to file a
notice of appeal whenever their client requests it133 even if the appeal would
be “wholly frivolous.”134 In the event that defense counsel believes that an
appeal would be frivolous, she must prepare an Anders brief, where she
points to anything in the record that could support the appeal.135 Defense
counsel must then provide this brief to the client to raise any additional
points the client wishes.136 At that point, the court reviews the brief and
makes a determination as to whether the appeal is “wholly frivolous.”137
Thus, where U.S. Attorney policy dissuades prosecutors from appealing,
defense attorneys are required to appeal when their client requests it.
In addition to the contrasting rules that govern the attorneys’ decisions
to appeal, individual criminal defendants and the government have
dramatically different incentives driving their decisions to appeal.
Individual criminal defendants are concerned only with their own sentence:
Will they face imprisonment or probation? If they will go to prison, how
long will they be deprived of their freedom? Accordingly, the stakes for
criminal defendants in a single case are high.138 The government, by
contrast, has the luxury of taking a macro approach, strategizing to shape

the sentence, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed reasoning that the district court had explained its downward
departure on the grounds that the defendant suffered from psychological problems. Id. at 433–34.
130
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 14, at 2-2.121.
131
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
132
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
133
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (“We have long held that a lawyer who
disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is
professionally unreasonable.”).
134
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. In 2014, defense attorneys filed 1,646 Anders briefs in federal appellate courts. 2014
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56.
138
Galanter, supra note 16, at 98.
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the landscape of the law in the long term.139 The government can carefully
select the cases where an appeal would move the law in a favorable
direction for the prosecution.140 It is therefore no surprise that of the fortythree cases that the government appealed in 2014, the government won
twenty-eight, or 65.1%, of them.141 The government is willing to make a
trade-off, sacrificing the opportunity to appeal an adverse sentencing
decision in an individual case to avoid the risk that the appellate court will
affirm that pro-defense decision. In this way, where the district court’s
reasoning would help the defense, the government can avoid having that
reasoning enshrined in an appellate court decision.142 This results in a body
of doctrine overwhelmingly composed of appellate court affirmances of
pro-prosecution decisions.
By contrast, criminal defense attorneys’ zealous advocacy on appeal
can have the perverse effect of contributing to the pro-prosecution skew of
the case law. As discussed above, in 74.4% of all defense-initiated appeals
in 2014, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s pro-prosecution
decision.143 Therefore, in 2014 alone, defense appeals generated 3,645 proprosecution appellate court decisions.144 In this way, when defense
attorneys advocate for the interests of one individual client, they may
actually contribute to a body of precedent that disadvantages criminal
defendants generally.
This Part has outlined the contributors to the one-sided body of
precedent: the lack of written district court opinions and disparate rates of
appeal between the prosecution and defense due to their divergent
incentives. Part III will discuss how the one-sided body of precedent results
in pro-prosecution doctrinal drift over time.
III.

CONTRIBUTORS TO DOCTRINAL DRIFT OVER TIME

Not only does the body of law interpreting the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines consist primarily of pro-prosecution appellate court affirmances
of district court decisions, but the doctrine itself actually drifts in a proprosecution direction with each subsequent round of appeals. When
139

See Masur, supra note 25, at 717 (reasoning that if a party is able to carefully appeal to produce
more favorable precedents, that party “might be capable, over time, of shifting the law in a direction
favorable to its interests”).
140
Galanter, supra note 16, at 101.
141
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56A. The government’s success rate of 65.1% must be
viewed in contrast to the average rate of reversal, 10.2%, as well as the rate of reversal on defense
appeal, 9.8%. Id. fig.M; id. tbl.56.
142
Galanter, supra note 16, at 101.
143
2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at tbl.56.
144
Id.
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defense attorneys write sentencing memoranda, their research turns up little
pro-defense case law,145 and this lack of favorable precedent may
discourage defense attorneys from even raising objections to sentence
enhancements. By contrast, when U.S. Attorneys prepare their sentencing
memoranda, a cursory search on Westlaw or LexisNexis produces a wealth
of pro-prosecution binding appellate court precedent to support their
arguments.146 A prosecution memorandum complete with citations to
binding authority is likely to be more persuasive to a district court judge
than a defense memorandum making unsupported assertions. When the
judge sides with the prosecution and the appellate court affirms the district
court decision based on deferential review, the cycle repeats itself ad
infinitum and the law grows increasingly favorable to the prosecution.
A.

The Defense Attorney’s Tools and Their Limitations

A survey of persuasive authorities available to a defense attorney
drafting a sentencing memorandum reveals the shortcomings of each type
of authority. As demonstrated in the previous Section, the overwhelming
majority of appellate court precedent reflects pro-prosecution reasoning.
This Section will show that written district court opinions are rare,
nonbinding, and more likely to reflect exceptional rather than run-of-themill cases,147 and neither transcripts on PACER nor Statement of Reasons
forms provide a clear picture of the district court judge’s reasoning.148
In contrast to federal appellate precedent, which is binding on all of
the lower courts in the circuit,149 district court precedent is to be considered
only to the extent that its reasoning is persuasive.150 In other words, district
courts are free to diverge from intra-district precedent, and do so with little
hesitation.151 Another limitation of district court opinions is that they are
not representative of the various judicial points of view or the variety of
cases. Because judges are not required to issue their sentencing decisions in
writing, some judges write many criminal sentencing opinions, whereas
other judges write few.152 Furthermore, written criminal sentencing
145

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
147
Scott, supra note 5, at 363.
148
Id.
149
See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that circuit law binds
all courts within a circuit, including all of the inferior courts in the circuit as well as future circuit
panels).
150
Mead, supra note 105, at 802.
151
Id.
152
Scott, supra note 5, at 366–67. According to a Westlaw query, Judge Lynn Adelman of the
Eastern District of Wisconsin has mentioned aggravating role enhancement § 3B1.1 in fifteen
146
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opinions may reflect outlier points of view, because judges have a special
motivation to produce a written opinion when they suspect that other
judges might disagree with their reasoning.153 Furthermore, due to time
constraints, judges must be selective in choosing the cases for which they
will issue a written sentencing opinion.154 Judges are more likely to select
outlier cases that are extraordinary or groundbreaking, and the result is that
written district court sentencing opinions provide model reasoning for
exceptional sentencing questions, but little guidance for garden-variety
sentencing issues.155 Lastly, because written district court sentencing
opinions are rare, finding a closely analogous case is unlikely.
Most district court sentencing decisions are issued by oral
pronouncements,156 which are recorded in transcripts and uploaded to
PACER, but these have drawbacks of their own. Obtaining transcripts of
analogous cases on PACER is inefficient and can be costly,157 and, because
the judge’s reasoning is not clearly presented in oral hearing transcripts,
their value as persuasive authority is doubtful.158 The search feature on
PACER is designed for those who know exactly what case they are looking
for, not for browsing by topic or key word. In fact, a search on PACER for
criminal matters only has the following fields: region, case number, case
title, date filed, date closed, party name, and party role.159 It does not permit
plain language or Boolean searches.160 Fortunately, federal defenders and
private attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act have free
PACER access.161 For privately retained defense attorneys,162 however, the

sentencing decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Tesillos, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040 (E.D. Wis. 2013).
By contrast, a more senior judge in the same district, Judge J.P. Stadtmueller, has authored only three
opinions mentioning § 3B1.1. See Culbert v. United States, No. 07-CV-046, 2008 WL 2062324 (E.D.
Wis. May 13, 2008); Payan v. United States, No. 07-CV-806, 2008 WL 582797 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 29,
2008); Kruppstadt v. United States, No. 04-CV-443, 2007 WL 2042251 (E.D. Wis. July 11, 2007); see
also Gertner, supra note 104, at 438 (commending Judges Mark Bennett, Lynn Adelman, John Gleason,
and Jack Weinstein for consistently authoring written sentencing opinions).
153
Scott, supra note 5, at 367.
154
Id. at 366.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 362–63.
157
For instance, a 300-page transcript would cost $30. PACER, ELECTRONIC ACCESS FEE
SCHEDULE (1), (2) (2013), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf [https://perma.cc/K952F7E7].
158
See Scott, supra note 5, at 363.
159
PACER USER MANUAL, supra note 19, at 16, 19.
160
A Boolean search uses key words or phrases and connectors like: AND, OR, and /s.
161
FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 157, at (10). The federal defenders are exempt from PACER fees
because they are authorized by the Criminal Justice Act. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2) (2012).
162
In 1998, criminal defendants retained private representation in 33.4% of felony cases and 18.7%
of misdemeanor cases. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE
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cost of browsing for analogous cases may be prohibitive. PACER users
cannot see the document until they pay for it.163 It is impractical to pay for a
document—at $0.10 a page—before knowing whether it will be helpful.164
Given the structure of the PACER system, it is unlikely that a criminal
defense attorney will find a transcript of an oral sentencing decision on
PACER that is both factually analogous to his case and has a defensefavorable outcome. On the off chance that she does, it is unclear what, if
any, persuasive effect a citation to this transcript would have on a district
court judge. Professor Ryan Scott, who has published several articles on
criminal sentencing, argues that hearing transcripts “do a poor job of
capturing the judge’s reasoning.”165 A judge’s oral pronouncement, Scott
points out, is intended for the people in the courtroom: mainly the
defendant, the lawyers, the witnesses, and those observing from the
gallery.166 The judge issuing an oral ruling does not express his or her
reasoning in a methodical manner so that future judges facing similar issues
might apply the same reasoning. Instead, Scott asserts, because oral
hearings are “often cluttered with irrelevant material, jarred by interruption,
and disorganized,” they are a “poor substitute for a written opinion
explaining the reasons for a sentence.”167
Likewise, judges are required to complete a Statement of Reasons
form in accordance with § 3553(c)(2), but these forms are not useful as
persuasive authority.168 The Statement of Reasons is a four-page form
where the judge can check boxes to indicate whether the sentence is above,
below, or within the Guidelines range, and to indicate the reasons for the
sentence using categories like “Victim Impact” or “Remorse/Lack of
Remorse.”169 The form also includes a space for the judge to provide a

COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
1
(2000),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7N9G-QAS6].
163
FEE SCHEDULE, supra note 157, at (1). The fee for most case documents is capped at $3.00,
even if they exceed 30 pages, but there is no price cap for transcripts of federal proceedings. Id. at (1),
(2).
164
Id.
165
Scott, supra note 5, at 363.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2012) (“The court shall provide a transcription or other appropriate
public record of the court’s statement of reasons, together with the order of judgment and commitment,
to the Probation System and to the Sentencing Commission, and, if the sentence includes a term of
imprisonment, to the Bureau of Prisons.”).
169
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, AO 245B JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE, STATEMENT OF
REASONS (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/706/download [https://perma.cc/5HHC-BRCQ]; Scott,
supra note 5, at 378.
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narrative description of the reasons for the sentence.170 A written narrative
description is required in two types of cases: (1) cases where the sentence
imposed falls outside the Guidelines range and (2) cases where the sentence
carries a term of imprisonment greater than twenty-four months.171 Judges
sometimes meet this requirement by attaching a transcript of the sentencing
hearing or, in rare cases,172 a written sentencing opinion.173 The Statement
of Reasons forms are generally not disclosed to the public.174 Therefore,
they are not made available on Westlaw or LexisNexis, and attorneys
cannot cite them as persuasive authority. Even if Statements of Reasons
forms were publicly available, checked boxes on a form do not provide
deep insights into the judge’s reasoning. In short, district court opinions,
transcripts on PACER, and Statement of Reasons forms do not compensate
for the lack of pro-defense appellate court precedent.
B.

Attorneys’ Reactions to the Lack of Pro-Defense Precedent

This Section will demonstrate that the lack of pro-defense case law
can weaken defense sentencing memoranda, give prosecutors greater
leverage in plea negotiations, and cause defense attorneys to abandon
potentially meritorious, but unsupported arguments. When faced with a
landscape of pro-prosecution precedent, defense attorneys’ best strategy
may be to distinguish their case from cases with pro-prosecution outcomes.
However, this is not as persuasive as citing analogous binding circuit court
authority.175 Suppose a defense attorney plans to challenge the application
of a § 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous weapon enhancement to her client’s drug
offense. To succeed she will have to show that “it is clearly improbable that
the weapon was connected with the offense.”176 Imagine that in her client’s
case, police found the gun in the bedroom closet and recovered distribution
170

Scott, supra note 5, at 378.
§ 3553(c)(1)–(2); see also Scott, supra note 5, at 378 (noting that judges sometimes write on the
back of the form or attach additional documents, such as transcripts or a sentencing opinion, to fulfill
this requirement).
172
See supra Section II.A.
173
Scott, supra note 5, at 378.
174
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (2001) (“[T]he forms entitled ‘Statement of
Reasons’ . . . will not be disclosed to the public.”); Scott, supra note 5, at 378.
175
In the employment discrimination context, Gertner discusses the effect of a one-sided body of
law on the way judges view cases. Gertner, supra note 31, at 115. She argues, “If case after case recites
the facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise that the decisionmakers have a hard time
envisioning the facts that may well comprise discrimination.” Id.
176
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/3JF7-AX5R].
171
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quantities of illegal drugs in the garage.177 There are a few cases where the
appellate courts found that the district court clearly erred in applying the
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, but the facts of those cases are so exceptional
that, if anything, they make the defense attorney’s challenge look weaker
by comparison, rather than stronger.178 For instance, the defense attorney
would be hard pressed to persuasively analogize her case to United States
v. Franklin.179 There, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court’s
application of the enhancement was clear error because the defendant’s
weapon was a “little pocket knife” he used to strip wires in his job as an
electrician and the police did not find it necessary to confiscate the
weapon.180
The defense attorney’s tools may, therefore, be limited to
distinguishing her case from more egregious cases where the appellate
courts affirmed the application of the enhancement. She could argue that
unlike the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Booker, where the
government’s informant saw an AK-47 on the couch next to the defendant
during controlled crack buys,181 her client’s weapon was merely a handgun
stowed in the closet where it did not pose an immediate threat of violence.
However, Booker provides no guidance as to what set of facts might
present too tenuous a connection between a gun and drugs. Therefore, this
comparison merely demonstrates that this defendant’s case is not quite as
bad as Booker. However, it does not logically follow that the enhancement
is inapplicable to this defendant’s offense.182 Thus, the lack of analogous
pro-defense case law can affect the relative strength of defense sentencing
memoranda.
Defense attorneys are at a further disadvantage when preparing
sentencing memoranda because they are forced to reinvent the wheel every
time they present an argument. When the government makes a novel
argument as to the interpretation of the Guidelines that succeeds at the
district court level, the defense will often appeal, and, in the majority of
cases, the appellate court will endorse the government’s argument,
177

Facts taken from United States v. Perez, 581 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2009), and modified slightly.
See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 484 F.3d 912, 913–16 (7th Cir. 2007).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
United States v. Booker, 248 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2001).
182
See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 460 (7th Cir. 2012). In Johns, the defendant
argued that the § 3A1.1 vulnerable victims enhancement did not apply. Id. He attempted to distinguish
his case from other more severe cases by pointing out that his victims only experienced financial
distress, whereas in other cases where the enhancement applied the victims experienced financial
distress in addition to other vulnerabilities (e.g., age and alcoholism). Id. The court rejected this
argument, and concluded that the enhancement applied. Id.
178
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permanently entrenching it in a written opinion.183 When a defense attorney
suggests a novel interpretation of the Guidelines and manages to persuade
the district court, that is usually the end of the story. In most cases the
district court will issue an oral ruling, the government will not appeal,184
and the defense attorney’s innovative argument will be forgotten, existing
only in a transcript. As a consequence, every time a defense attorney wants
to present this argument, it will be novel to the judge even if her colleagues
down the hall or across the country have already endorsed it in an oral
ruling.185 Unlike the government attorneys who can support their arguments
with a citation to circuit authority sanctioning them,186 defense attorneys
have to expend effort persuading the judge of the argument’s validity as if
it were the first time every time.
The one-sided body of precedent may give prosecutors greater
leverage in plea negotiations as well. Prosecutors can be more confident
that the courts will accept their interpretations of the Guidelines because
they have appellate court precedent to support their assertions, whereas
defense attorneys cannot be as convinced that their arguments will succeed.
This confidence disparity may give prosecutors the upper hand in plea
negotiations with defense attorneys. For instance, in exchange for a guilty
plea, a prosecutor may agree that a certain “sentencing factor does or does
not apply,” and once the court accepts the plea agreement, that
recommendation binds the court.187 The defense attorney may be somewhat
hopeful that he can persuade the court that an enhancement does not apply
without the prosecutor’s agreement. However, because the defense attorney
has no assurance that his argument will succeed, accepting the plea
agreement may be worth avoiding the risk of failure.
Finally, defense attorneys faced with a dearth of favorable precedent
may be discouraged from even challenging the applicability of sentence
enhancements. Lawyers are trained not to make an assertion unless they
have case law to back it up.188 In this vein, a survey of federal judges
revealed that their principal complaint about attorneys’ writing was their
failure to effectively use “relevant, controlling authority” to support their
183

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II.
185
Criminal defense attorneys can combat this by sharing successful arguments with one another at
federal criminal defense conferences, for instance.
186
Risinger, supra note 126, at 467, 473 (observing that prosecutors tend to bolster their arguments
with string cites to appellate court decisions).
187
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
188
Voigt, supra note 23 (advising lawyers to avoid making assertions without citations to
precedent because “without citations, judges might think that the stated rules and arguments are merely
your opinions—which are irrelevant”).
184
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position.189 Many federal districts’ local rules even require that arguments
be supported by “citations of authority.”190 Therefore, defense attorneys
who cannot find case law to support their arguments may not make them at
all. Over time, defense attorneys may become discouraged by the evergrowing heap of pro-prosecution circuit court precedent.191
C.

Whose Brief Is More Likely to Persuade the Judge?

District court judges are more likely to decide a case in accordance
with appellate court precedent than to go against the grain, and because the
majority of appellate court precedent favors the prosecution, pro-defense
arguments are at a great disadvantage. To understand how district courts
interpret appellate court holdings, it is crucial to first understand the impact
of the standard of review applied by the appellate courts. Professor
Jonathan Masur argues that judges tend to ignore the deference paid by the
prior reviewing court and are prone to view all precedent through “nondeferential prisms.”192 For example, suppose an appellate court issues an
opinion holding that the district court did not “clearly err” in applying the
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous weapon enhancement193 when the gun is in the
closet and the drugs are in the garage.194 Masur’s argument suggests that a
future judge deciding a similar case is likely to misinterpret the holding as
expressing the rule that when the gun is in the closet and the drugs are in
the garage, the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement applies.195 Of course, the
appellate court is not declaring the district court’s holding as the rule,

189

Robbins, supra note 25, at 264 (presenting the results of a survey of federal judges, which
reveal that “first and foremost, judges are critical of lawyers’ inability to use relevant controlling
authority to their advantage”).
190
See, e.g., N.D. ILL. CRIM. R. 1(b) (“A contested motion shall be accompanied by a short, concise
brief in support of the motion, together with citations of authority.” (emphasis added)); E.D. VA. CRIM.
R. 12(A) (“All motions, unless otherwise directed by the Court, shall be accompanied by a written brief
setting forth a concise statement of the facts and supporting reasons, along with a citation of the
authorities upon which the movant relied.” (emphasis added)).
191
Risinger, supra note 126, at 469 (noting that from 2003 to 2007 all courts affirmed the
admission of handwriting identification expert testimony and the number of decisions where the
admissibility of handwriting testimony was contested decreased rapidly—from eighteen between 2002
and 2003 to only one in 2007). Contra Gertner, supra note 31, at 115 (indicating that although one
might expect litigants to realize that their chances of success are low and stop filing employment
discrimination suits, the record reveals that litigants continue filing their claims regardless).
192
Masur, supra note 25, at 706–07.
193
See, e.g., United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We review factual
findings under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error; we give due deference to the application of the
Guidelines to the facts; we review purely legal questions de novo.” (quoting United States v. Vaziri,
164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999))).
194
See supra text accompanying note 177.
195
Masur, supra note 25, at 706–07.
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because if the appellate court had the opportunity to make a determination
in the first instance, it may have found that the enhancement did not apply.
There are several reasons why this type of mistake is commonplace: (1)
judges tend to focus on the holding of a case, as opposed to the standard of
review under which it was decided, (2) judges may—correctly or
incorrectly—believe that the standard of review did not factor into the
appellate court’s decision, and (3) evaluating precedent as nondeferential is
less “cognitively taxing” than evaluating precedent in light of the standard
of review applied.196
Masur provides an example of twenty-five cases discussing the
admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence.197 In twenty-four out of twentyfive cases, the defendant had appealed the admission of the evidence and
the appellate court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.198 Of course, if the appellate court reviewed an
instance where the district court excluded the evidence, it may have also
found that the court did not abuse its discretion. Despite this, a district court
may not feel free to disregard these twenty-four cases and use its discretion
to exclude the evidence.199
Furthermore, when a judge issues a decision diverging from
precedent, she must expend additional effort and make a strong case to
support the departure. When judges rely on precedent, they can use the
information and reasoning that courts have produced in previous cases.200
By contrast, a decision diverging from precedent requires more intellectual
effort and a greater time investment by the judge, because the judge must
start from square one investigating the innovative aspects of the case and
the legal arguments presented.201 Departing from precedent has another
important cost: a judge who deviates from appellate case law may face
criticism by colleagues, extrajudicial institutions, and the public at large.202
Consequently, a judge issuing an opinion that does not coincide with the
pattern of appellate court cases will find it necessary to make strong
196

Id.
Id. at 683.
198
Id. In the twenty-fifth case, the government sought a writ of mandamus directing the district
court to admit the latent fingerprint evidence, which the court granted. Id. at 683 & n.202 (citing In re
United States, 614 F.3d 661, 662 (7th Cir. 2010)).
199
Masur, supra note 25, at 683. Risinger provides another example in the area of handwriting
identification expertise. Risinger, supra note 126, at 469. He notes that courts deciding whether to admit
handwriting identification evidence produced “highly authority driven” opinions supported by string
cites to appellate court precedent. Id.
200
Ponzetto, supra note 3, at 384.
201
Id.
202
Id.
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arguments for why this case should come out differently—a labor-intensive
task.203 Moreover, judges may be particularly inclined to conform to
existing practice in criminal sentencing because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
calls on them to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”204
Thus, when judges are confronted with a prosecution brief citing to an
abundance of favorable binding appellate court precedent and a defense
brief with sparse citations to persuasive authority, they will likely tend to
conform their decisions to the binding precedent and side with the
prosecution.205 The result is that with each subsequent round of appeals, the
law inches further and further in a pro-prosecution direction.
IV.

OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY INFLUENCE JUDICIAL
DECISIONMAKING AND CONCERNS

This Note contends that two extrajudicial factors—lack of written
district court opinions and disparate rate of appeals—contribute to doctrinal
drift in a pro-prosecution direction. However, a confluence of other factors
may influence sentencing decisions, including judges’ political and
ideological leanings,206 their desire to avoid reversal,207 and their aim to
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Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012).
205
See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco, No. CR 13–2643 JB, 2014 WL 34211063, at *6 (D.N.M.
July 8, 2014) (rejecting the argument that the § 2K2.1(b)(6) firearm enhancement does not apply when
the defendant possesses only a small amount of drugs and citing four appellate court cases that also
rejected that position).
206
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.8 (2010) (survey of federal district court judges revealing
that for certain offenses—child pornography possession and receipt and drug trafficking of crack
cocaine—a majority of judges believe the sentencing range is too high); Joshua B. Fischman & Max M.
Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL
STUD. 405, 431 (2011) (concluding that judges appointed by Democrats are more likely than their
Republican counterparts to depart downward in criminal sentencing); Max M. Schanzenbach &
Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory
and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 52–53 (2007) (analyzing data and concluding that Democratic
judges, as compared to Republican judges, are more likely to impose lower sentences for street crimes,
and that Democratic judges are particularly lenient when the appellate panel is composed mostly of
Democratic appointees); Scott, supra note 5, at 373–74 (asserting that judges have “deep disagreements
about sentencing values and priorities”); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some
Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48 (1990) (suggesting that
appellate courts may be prejudiced against defendants because they have been found guilty of a crime).
207
See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 941, 984 (1995) (stating that judicial reversal “reflects professional criticism by other
professionals”); Fischman & Schanzenbach, supra note 206, at 431 (analyzing data of district court
sentencing decisions and concluding that, in some instances, district court judges may adjust their
decisions in order to avoid reversal).
204
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preserve the reviewability of their rulings,208 among others.209 At least some
of these factors may either exacerbate or curb the effects of the
extrajudicial factors discussed above that produce pro-prosecution doctrinal
drift, but none appears to cancel them out.
Professor Kate Stith has argued that appellate court criminal precedent
evolves in a pro-defendant direction—not a pro-prosecution direction—
because double jeopardy prevents the government from appealing.210 Stith
argues that appellate courts will commit errors in some percentage of
cases.211 For instance, they will affirm the admission of a confession when
they should reverse (“pro-government error”) and they will reverse the
admission of a confession when they should affirm (“pro-defendant
error”).212 Because the government does not appeal, it bears the burden of
error at the district court level.213 Further, because the appellate court
reviews primarily defense appeals, Stith argues that the number of prodefendant errors will be much greater than the number of pro-government
errors, thereby causing the law to shift in a pro-defendant direction.214
Stith’s argument rests on the assumption that appellate courts are
equally likely to erroneously reverse a decision as they are to erroneously
affirm a decision. Her argument fails to take into account the deference
paid to lower courts and does not address the unique characteristics of the
sentencing context. An appellate court often reviews the lower court’s
sentencing decisions for clear error.215 As a result, the appellate court is
likely to affirm in many cases where, if the appellate court were deciding
the issue in the first instance, it would issue the opposite ruling. In fact, the
rate of reversal is very low at only 10.2%.216 Therefore, appellate courts are
much more likely to affirm a decision that departs from the legal standard
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Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:
A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 520 n.22 (1973).
209
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purpose Do
They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 389–90 (2002) (asserting that an advantage to ruling in favor of the
defense is that the decision will not be appealed and that finality reduces the caseload of the courts).
210
Stith, supra note 206, at 7, 17; see also Joshua Steinglass, The Justice System in Jeopardy: The
Prohibition on Government Appeals of Acquittals, 31 IND. L. REV. 353, 382 (1998) (arguing that the
double jeopardy prohibition on government appeals causes the doctrine to shift in a pro-defendant
direction and recommending that the government be permitted to appeal erroneous acquittals).
211
Stith, supra note 206, at 17.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 18.
214
Id. at 17.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 114–19.
216
In 2014, the appellate courts reversed criminal sentencing decisions in 10.2% of cases and
affirmed in part and reversed in part in 2.3% of cases. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at fig.M.
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than they are to reverse such a decision, meaning that, in fact, the
asymmetric rate of appeals favors the government.
Further, as discussed above, unlike in decisions to acquit or convict,
where the government cannot appeal because of double jeopardy
prohibitions, the government can appeal adverse sentencing decisions.217
Therefore, Stith’s assertion that the government bears the burden of error in
the lower court is inapplicable in the sentencing context. As written district
court sentencing opinions are rare, the government bears little risk of
unfavorable precedent that will affect future cases.218 Because the
government can choose not to appeal criminal sentencing rulings, it can
make a strategic decision to leave district court pro-defense errors
unchallenged.
V.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

This Part will survey potential solutions to doctrinal drift to prevent
the law from morphing into an unrecognizable body of pro-prosecution
precedent. Ultimately, judicial skepticism of doctrinal developments may
be the only workable solution. One option is to require judges to generate
more written opinions, but this alternative does not seem feasible. Scholars
have been urging judges to write full sentencing opinions for years.219
However, judges must issue a high volume of sentencing decisions and
producing a written opinion is time-consuming.220 Therefore, requiring
written opinions could hamper the speedy resolution of disputes or cause
judges to give short shrift to other written opinions.221
Another alternative is for judges to keep an open mind as to what
constitutes persuasive authority and give weight to citations to Statements
of Reasons or oral hearing transcripts, but due to the limitations of these
sources, this potential solution seems unworkable. As discussed above, the
Statement of Reasons provides little guidance to future jurists facing
similar factual scenarios because judges simply check boxes on a standard
217

United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 132 (1980) (“From this it follows that the
Government’s taking a review of respondent’s sentence does not in itself offend double jeopardy
principles just because its success might deprive respondent of the benefit of a more lenient sentence.”).
218
See supra text accompanying notes 101–07.
219
Scott, supra note 5, at 362 (“For years scholars have been urging sentencing judges to issue fullfledged published sentencing decisions more frequently.” (first citing Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich,
Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54–55
(2007); then citing Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial
Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 940 (1996); and then citing Steven L. Chanenson,
Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 147 (2006))).
220
Scott, supra note 5, at 363.
221
Cohen, supra note 101, at 523.
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form to indicate the reasons for a sentence.222 Oral hearing transcripts are
similarly unsuitable because they do not clearly articulate a judge’s
reasoning and are intended more for the parties in the courtroom than for
future judges.223
Professor Ryan Scott analyzed the feasibility of an “open access
approach” where defense attorneys and judges would enjoy open access to
a database of past sentencing information.224 Under this approach, defense
attorneys and prosecutors could include citations to sentencing outcomes in
the database in briefs and at sentencing hearings.225 By presenting judges
with similar cases in which below-Guidelines sentences were imposed,
defense attorneys could persuade judges they would not be going out on a
limb if they imposed the requested sentence.226 However, the open access
approach is useful primarily to promote inter-judge consistency in the
length of sentences. Its utility is limited in addressing the problem
identified in this Note because it does nothing to preserve district court
judges’ reasoning for electing not to impose a particular enhancement or
opting to grant a reduction.
The best solution may simply be for courts to be aware of the proprosecution skew of the precedent and to view the doctrine with
skepticism.227 The two examples of pro-prosecution shifts in the doctrine
identified here could have been avoided if judges and their clerks carefully
researched not only the most recent precedent but older precedent as
well.228 Likewise, the risk of pro-prosecution doctrinal drift is reduced if
courts are wary of string cites in prosecution briefs and do not take for
granted the “rule” that they present. Lastly, thoroughly examining the text
of the Guidelines before reviewing the case law interpreting it could serve
to reign in doctrinal drift.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that pro-prosecution doctrinal drift is the
result not of careful judicial reasoning, but of extrajudicial factors,
principally (1) the disparate rate of appeals between the defense and
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Scott, supra note 5, at 378.
See supra text accompanying notes 156–66.
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Scott, supra note 5, at 349, 399–400.
225
Id. at 399.
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See Masur, supra note 25, at 730 (“[I]t may simply be appropriate for courts . . . to view
particular doctrines with greater skepticism because of the possibility that those doctrines have evolved
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See supra text accompanying notes 79–97.
223

1165

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

prosecution and (2) the lack of written decisions at the district court level.
Because 99% of appeals are defense appeals, appellate courts almost
exclusively review pro-prosecution district court decisions. In part due to
deference, appellate courts affirm the majority of these decisions. As a
result, the body of appellate court sentencing precedent is composed
primarily of pro-prosecution appellate court opinions affirming district
court decisions. This problem is further exacerbated in the sentencing
context because district courts usually issue sentencing decisions by oral
pronouncement. The opinions that are most likely to present pro-defense
reasoning are district court decisions, but written sentencing decisions at
this level are rare. If a district court judge interprets a subsection of the
Guidelines in a manner that is favorable to the defense, that reasoning will
most likely become silent law that serves the particular defendant but has
no generative force.
When writing sentencing memoranda aimed at persuading the court
that a sentence reduction should apply or that an enhancement should not
apply, defense attorneys have little authority to support their arguments.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, have a plethora of case law to choose from
to bolster their position, and because of this, judges reviewing these briefs
are likely to find the prosecution’s more persuasive. As a result, circuit
doctrine will grow increasingly prosecution-friendly with each subsequent
round of appeals. The best response to prevent the law from surreptitiously
slipping through judges’ fingers may simply be to draw judges’ attention to
the fact that sentencing doctrine has a tendency to drift in a pro-prosecution
direction and call on them to view the doctrine with a skeptical eye.
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